The Russian Federation in its first decade (after the dissolution of the USSR) failed to develop a clear monetary framework or to stabilise the economy, but from 2002 gradual monetary and financial reform was undertaken without a formal framework or targets, until the adoption of inflation targets in 2017, which could not, however, be sustained from 2021.
| Years | Targets and attainment | Classification |
| 1992-2001 | 2-tier banking system, highly concentrated; central bank role complicated 1992-93 by residual relationship with other ruble-using FSU states; monetary policy in principle moving towards indirect instruments via growing interbank and other financial markets, but repeatedly dominated by large fiscal deficits (after as well as before 1995 law on central bank independence) and lack of hard budget constraints for SOEs; exchange rate initially unified and freed but heavily managed via interest rates and intervention, with formal band from mid-1995 and then sliding bands from mid-1996 (at depreciation rate less than inflation); attempts at stabilisation typically not sustained but undermined, resulting in hyperinflation 1992-3, financial market crunch August 1995 (interbank interest rates over 1000%), persistent high inflation, and major financial crisis August 1998 with debt repudiation and banking failures; exchange rate floated September 1998 | unstructured discretion UD |
| 2002-16 | monetary policy instruments gradually getting sorted out (e.g. by 2003 central bank running regular deposit auctions, as main tool for liquidity management), and moving towards indirect: repo rate becomes informal and then 1-week auction rate becomes formal policy rate within corridor in 2014; exchange rate formally flexible and intervention becomes less frequent towards end of period; oil stabilisation fund from 2004 and, partly as result, fiscal dominance somewhat less problematic than in past; conflict between exchange rate and inflation objectives resolved towards end of period in favour of latter; converging inflation targets introduced from 2014 but overshot 2014, 2015 and most of 2016 | loosely structured discretion LSD |
| 2017-20 | stationary point inflation targets for 2017-20 attained, though inflation targeting arguably in need of further improvement, e.g. with respect to communication and de facto asymmetry of target; major impact of and policy response to Covid-19 | full inflation targeting FIT |
| 2021-23 | [TENTATIVE: No Article IV Reports, no inflation data in International Financial Statistics after March 2022] invasion of Ukraine and start of war February 2022, followed by economic sanctions by western countries; inflation target for 2021 overshot, those for 2022 and 2023 (despite very sharp fall in early 2023, with inflation target temporarily undershot) probably well overshot (but data issues), with consumer expectations continuously well above target | loosely structured discretion LSD |
Selected IMF references: PMER 1992 pp45-6; RED April 1993 pp41-2; RED 1994 pp31-40; RED 1997 pp33-49; RED 1999 pp7-25, 71-94; SR 1999 pp29-30; SR 2002 pp14-15; SI 2003 chIV; SR 2003 p22; SR 2005 pp22-3; SR 2006 pp20-21; SI 2007 chI; SR 2007 pp13-14; SR 2008 pp19-21; SR 2010 pp18-20; SI 2011 chII; SR 2012 pp21-2; SR 2013 p13; SR 2014 pp21-2; SR 2017 p12; SR 2018 pp12-13, 25, 45; SR 2019 pp13-14, 32; SR 2021 p25.
Other sources: Bank of Russia, Annual Report for 2022, pp30-2; Bank of Russia, Annual Report for 2023, pp8-11; Bank of Finland (2024).
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Monetary Policy Frameworks 